Islamic Political Movement in Indonesia

After “Aksi Bela Islam Jilid I, II and III

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Abstrak


Abstract

Does “Aksi Bela Islam” show a new map of the Islamic Political Movement in Indonesia? Has the Movement for "Islamic Defense" changed the map of the Indonesian Islamist movement? What (or is there) a further impact on Indonesian democracy? Departing from these questions, this paper shows that, first, fragmentation of religious authority has occurred after the “Aksi Bela Islam”. NU and Muhammadiyah are no longer the sole authority in religious affairs in Indonesia. In addition to the fragmentation of religious authorities this article states that the ABI is a "protest movement" and "solidarity action" whose acceleration is stronger in the context of domestic issues, namely the Governor of Jakarta, which is vulnerable to maintaining long-term issues. So to be able to change the map of a strong Islamic political movement required a strong foundation of the initiators of the “Aksi Bela Islam”.

Keywords: Islamic Defense Action, Islamic Political Movement, Fragmentation of Religious Authorities.
Introduction

Indonesia is a country that has succeeded in transforming the political system from authoritarianism to democracy and through a relatively peaceful era of democratic transition. This has made the Indonesian state a new democratic force of the world that counts. As a Muslim-majority country, Indonesia can be called a prime example, if not the only one, that has succeeded in making Islam and democracy as two lovebirds that are inseparable from one another. Post-Reformation the role of Islamic Civil Society by referring to the two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah and NU provides an optimistic picture of the role of Muslims in Indonesia's democratization. (Hefner: 2001) Both of these organizations actively encourage democratization through democratic electoral systems, law enforcement, anti-corruption fatwas, encourage good governance, and are active in the development of social life through the establishment of educational, health and social facilities. All of them contribute to creating a better democratic life (Civil).

After Hefner's optimism with Islamic Civilization was explained, changes in the pattern of Islamic relations and democracy in Indonesia have undergone various changes. Martin van Bruinessen, for example, noted that there was a conservative turn, namely the shift or reversal of the face of Indonesian Islam in a conservative direction (Bruinessen: 2013). There has been a change in Islam in Indonesia in the reform era, from friendly Islam (known as "smiling Islam") to something we can call Islam "angry". From moderate Islam, progressive, if not liberal, becomes conservative Islam. The increase in conservatism also occurred at Muhammadiyah, as shown in great detail in the study of Ahmad Najib Burhani. This was felt since Din Syamsuddin led this organization, replacing M. Amien Rais and Ahmad Syafii Maarif. As a result, for example, the role of progressive young people, also generally among women, is increasingly marginalized (Bruinessen: 2013).
The fading of Islamic hospitality is also evident from the increasing popularity of Sharia-compliant regional regulations. This was among others driven by the Preparatory Committee for the Enforcement of Islamic Law (KPPSI) in South Sulawesi, which was reviewed by Mujiburrahman (Bruinessen: 2013). Although the seeds were planted when Kahar Muzakkar rebelled to establish an Islamic state, the movement seemed to gain new momentum thanks to the availability of democracy in the Reformation era. Remember, Abdul Azis Kahar, Chief of KPPSI, was the son of Kahar Muzakkar who had been a member of the Regional Civil Service Council (DPD) for the support of the PPP and the United Nations. And the most obvious phenomenon of the rise of Islam "anger" in Indonesia appears in Surakarta, Central Java, which is related to the Ngruki Islamic Boarding School, as described by Muhammad Wildan (Bruinessen: 2013). According to him, and the evidence is quite clear, Islamic radicalism under the leadership of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir justifies the use of methods of violence in fighting for the establishment of an Islamic state.

The rare phenomenon that occurred in part of the Indonesian Muslim community towards the end of 2016 was the emergence of a series of actions "Bela Islam" which succeeded in mobilizing very many Muslims in Jakarta which seemed to surprise many observers. Many people's surprise at these actions came up against the background of the notion that Indonesian Islam, as often advertised, is a tolerant, peaceful and, furthermore, model of Islam that supports the ideals of democracy. Why is this movement moving like a snowball that continues to grow and get widespread sympathy from the community, or is it a series of actions "Bela Islam" (1, 2, 3) that is a sign of the changing picture of Indonesian Muslims.

As far as the discourse that arises regarding the "Bela Islam" Movement is triggered by specific accusations about blasphemy by DKI Governor Basuki Tjahya Purnama. But along with the broadening of the action participants, the issues that emerged have touched many other issues such as the re-emergence of anti-Chinese
sentiment, economic and political injustice, to the concerns in the security sector with the active radical group cells. One other aspect that demands attention is that the movement has had an impact on the regions of Eastern Indonesia where Muslims become minorities such as Manado and Kupang with active paramilitary groups similar to Jakarta.

Discourse that arises regarding the dangers of the economy controlled by ethnic Chinese migrants scattered on social media and in the community, including associated with the DKI Regional Election. At this point, the issue of inequality arises inevitably. Economically, ethnic minorities hold a significant portion of the national economic cake. The campaign to boycott foreign products, as well as the movement to develop economically independently after the "Bela Islam" Action movement shows how this unrest is so strongly felt by the community. Concerns about the emergence of the strength of the terrorist movement also emerged amidst the strengthening of the mobilization of this movement. Sidney Jones briefly expressed his analysis before the Islamic Defense Action. The extent to which the terrorism movement, which threatens national security, is involved in this latest development, and, conversely, is there any influence from the latest development (Bela Islam) on strengthening terrorism.

On the one hand, the "Islamic Action" movement became a hope because it was able to encourage and become a government stabilizer, but at a time when others were increasingly threatening. The public's enthusiasm for various problems, especially in terms of economic, political, and moral degradation, makes people look for new alternatives. One of them is the emergence of various Islamic political thoughts which later gave birth to many movements. Consolidation at the state level continues, but at the same time, there is internal consolidation among Muslims. This phenomenon can be read from the emergence of Islamic political movements with various actual issues. Enforcement of the Shari’ah, Islamic state, Islamic caliphate, civil society, and Islamic legal-form movements in political life.
From a political point of view, the Islamic Defense Act that occurred was clearly not an ordinary demonstration. His presence was more as a social movement which was loaded with ideological content, which then sparked discourse regarding the rise of the political Islam movement in Indonesia. So that this study looks at how to explain the phenomenon of "Islamic Defense", which is the success of mobilizing hundreds of thousands, or even claiming millions of Muslims around Monas? This is related to the question of how to name this development. Is this an expression of intolerance of a small group of Muslims, a new stage that is higher than the series of expressions and manifestations of intolerance that some of ABI's central organizations have been supporting for the past 15 years? But then how to explain the seemingly widespread support, as shown in the Islamic Defense Act, while the organizations did not have many previous supporters, especially when compared with the two largest Islamic organizations that have existed since the last 100 years in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama? The next question is, Does the "Action of Islamic Defense" Movement change the map of the Indonesian Islamic movement? What (or is there) a further impact on Indonesian democracy?

**Defining "Aksi Bela Islam" I, II and III**

Massive demonstrations on October 14, 2016, November 4, 2016 and December 2, 2016 conducted by a number of elements of the Islamic movement can be defined at least based on two epistemological grounds. The first foundation is a structural-functional paradigm such as in the writings of Charles J. Chaplin and Hei Wei Wang and other articles in an online Asian study journal, New Mandala. This paradigm departs from the view of modern social science which views society, with its ideology, political actions, and social actions which are essentially (fixed) which have certain functions in the macro structure (in this context, the state).
The first (modern) view in defining this "Islamic Defense Action", uses a lot of social movement theory pioneered by Charles Tilly and his students. For them, social movements occur if they fulfill several main elements, namely the existence of political entrepreneurs who have strong authority to offer ideas and appeal to the community; resource mobilization that can mobilize people from various sources (regions, mass organizations, and primordial ties); frame that makes attention focused on one goal only; and a political position where social movements occupy a thin slice between the state and society.

Unlike the movement (or political party) that wants to be in power, social movements are not involved in official politics (although it does involve political actors) but only want to influence power. If so, GNPF-MUI officials are included in the category of political entrepreneurs (mockingly, a Driyarkara STF lecturer, Herry B. Priyono, in his column in Kompas last January translated political entrepreneurs as "Political Breeders") (Priyono: 2017). With their authority, they mobilized resources in the form of mobilizing masses of action from various parts of Indonesia, with a frame that directed the spotlight on the blasphemy of religion by Ahok. The goal of GNPF, in this paradigm, is to take a bargaining position before the government so that its political steps are taken into account.

Adherents of this paradigm will assume that this is something normal in a liberal democratic country, which assumes that humans (and society) have the same rationality when dealing with problems. Efforts to answer the problem rationally, in this paradigm, will deliver the community to a more advanced and modern state. Against the Action of Islamic Defense, they "at best" only condemn the arguments of the participants of the action, which in their measure are far from rational because it brings the issue of religion to the center of social life, opposes kafir leaders, and so on. As a recommendation to fellow researchers and policy makers, they usually offer the application of ideas of liberalism, pluralism, and the like, as an effort to "rationalize" society.
At the global level, especially in the Middle East context, studies like this have produced a book of research collections entitled Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach edited by Quintan Wicktorowick, published in 2007. The book is the first book to apply social movement theory in the Islamic world. Previously, the theory was more often used to study the marxist and anarchist movements in North America and Europe. In the book, researchers examine Islamic movements of Middle Eastern and North African countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, and Libya. They found certain patterns in these movements, such as the emergence of charismatic figures, mass mobilization for Friday prayers (called "Political Friday"), the issue of the existence of a Jewish-US conspiracy in the lives of the people, the destruction of moral authority, etc. One of the most interesting findings and recommendations of the book is their prediction of a bloody democratic transition in the Middle East, and it was proven several years later. This, for them, was due to the inequality between the old ideologies and the younger and more liberal "reformers".

The second foundation is the postmarxis paradigm as seen in the book Vedi R. Hadiz (2016) entitled Islamic Populism in Indonesia and the Middle East published by Cambridge University Press. This paradigm departs from the postmodern view of social science which views society as a collection of contingent individuals (can exist, can be absent) so that it does not have an essence that continues (continuously). Community events, in this paradigm, are actions that are not essential (essentialist), even in fact not meaningful at all. It is only considered meaningful because there is a certain power that surrounds it and has an interest in perpetuating it into a "populism".

This second view, namely posmarxis long before the Islamic Defense Act was held, Vedi R. Hadiz has written a book "Islamic Populism", which examines a new phenomenon called "populism" in the Indonesian, Turkish and Egyptian Islamic communities. The basic idea of populism is the conditioning of society in a
majoritarianism mentality, in which the majority are depicted as oppressed and threatened by their power outside. Majoritarianism itself is actually something that is invented, not essential. Populism was originally a theory of political philosopher Ernesto Laclau, a Marxist who witnessed firsthand how the Marxist movements in Europe were demoralized, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union. By taking several postmodernist theses, Laclau reformulated Marxist thought.

For Laclau, the biggest obstacle to the marchist articulation is their stuttering in managing common issues and seizing discourse in the community. If you want to succeed, for Laclau, social activists must be able to seize empty spaces called "politics", "democracy" and "society" itself. Why is it called empty space? Because these concepts, and even any concept in this world, in a postmodern view is a meaningless emptiness. What is called meaning, discourse, and language in a concept is actually determined by the holder of power. To win politics, Laclau suggests that Marxists no longer get trapped in essentialist views such as hostile "bourgeois" and "proletariat", and will deterministically lead to the dictatorship of the proletariat as imagined by Karl Marx.

In the context of the Islamic Defense Act, for Hadiz in a discussion in the Tempo office, the main figures of the GNPF succeeded in forming a majoritarianism called "Muslims" who were described as dealing with infidels, communists and the like. From there a hardened identity is formed, even though it was initially liquid. The hardened identity immediately draws distance between "us" and "them". In this reading, what is called "Muslims" is actually an empty marker, which can be filled by anyone who has an Islamic ID card, but this empty identity is filled by majoritarianism formed by GNPF. In fact, there are many Muslims who do not feel represented by the GNPF and the mass Action of the Islamic Community, because of certain differences (schools, political choices, etc.).
What is the purpose of this reading? In addition to showing the identity populism of "Muslims" who are actually vulnerable to melting, the posmarxis paradigm also wants to show the power relations within it. They associate populism with the oligarchy, where there is a collection of demagogues, financiers and political players who condition the majoritarianism to establish their position and interests. This is what makes the researchers paradigmatic in linking Islamic Action with the interests of SBY, Prabowo, Tommy Suharto, and so on who are dealing with a new bourgeoisie behind Ahok.

Analysis of the two views explicitly shows two different thinking bases, but one thing is certain from the massive demonstration on October 14, 2016, November 4, 2016 and December 2, 2016 conducted by a number of elements of the Islamic movement further confirms the assessment that Islam sectarian politics is the dominant face of political Islam today. The combination of various political expressions, ranging from puritan ethno-religious sentiments to sectarian-racist sentiments, political disillusionment, elite patronage politics, to class expression, mixed into one and difficult to distinguish from one another.

**Weakening of the Religious Authority (Fragmentation of Religious Authority)**

Like Sunni Islam in many Islamic countries, Indonesia actually does not recognize a single authority. Islamic authority in Indonesia spreads in various layers, both in religious institutions, state institutions, and local figures. Religious institutions such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, Persis have fatwa institutions to guide their people in various religious matters. Likewise the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) through the Fatwa Commission regularly issues a number of fatwas.

The existence of various fatwa institutions is actually evidence of the pluralism of understanding and interpretation of Islam in Indonesia. Among the fatwa institutions, their opinions cannot deny or abolish one another. The diversity
of opinions of fatwa institutions is no more than a diversity of legal opinions that give people room to choose. The truth of a legal fatwa does not solely lie in accuracy in terms of conformity with the arguments of texts (manqūl), but how far the fatwa can provide fair moral guidance for the community to solve the problems he faces. Therefore, the fatwa from the manqūl side is correct, not necessarily that he finds relevance to be followed in real life.

Among the fatwa institutions in Indonesia, the MUI can be said to be an important fatwa institution. Not only because the MUI was formed by the new order government, but because later there were attempts to make the MUI fatwa a part of the legislative process. There have been attempts to make the MUI fatwa a positive law. In addition, several MUI fatwas often lead to controversy and are legitimized by certain groups of violence. The MUI seems to be the holder of the highest religious authority in Indonesia.

Rizieq Syihab is a name that is a new center of religious authority after the Islamic Defense Act. The fame of Rizieq Syihab was due to his success in initiating the National Movement for the Defense of the Indonesian Ulama 'Fatwa Council (GNPF-MUI). But there are things that need to be seen from the period of its development, the MUI experienced changes that led to an attitude of conservatism (Ichwan: 2005). If previously (the New Order era) was more as a "servant of the ruler," since the 6th congress in 2000, the MUI defined itself as a "servant of the interests of the people". The question is, can the tasks and service functions of the people be run by the MUI? Whether the fatwas issued by the MUI have provided a solution to the problems experienced by the people, or whether it is part of the problem.

On the other hand, MUI membership which consists of Islamic organizations, not individuals, is also quite problematic. Because each member has the same number of envoys and the same vote, so even though the NU and
Muhammadiyah have the largest number of members, they have the same voting weight as mass organizations with a small number of members. In other words, even though the NU and Muhammadiyah people have a moderate view, but because the vote weight is the same as that of small organizations that think extremically, there are extreme fatwas issued.

The 7th MUI National Conference became a very important momentum. This event can be said as a forum to affirm the MUI’s attitude towards issues that are considered "threatening the purity of Islam". The MUI issued 11 fatwas, some of which triggered controversy. The fatwa reasons are: (1) haram violation of intellectual property rights; (2) haram shamanism and forecasting; (3) unlawful prayer between religions, except prayer according to their respective beliefs. Muslims can only practice prayers led by Muslims. Collective prayer between religions is considered a heresy and is not taught in Islamic sharia; (4) unlawful interfaith marriage; (5) unlawful inheritance, except with wills and grants; (6) MUI has the authority to issue criteria of benefit or goodness for the people; (7) MUI prohibits pluralism (views that equate all religions), secularism, and liberalism; (8) private property rights must be protected by the state, and there is no right for the state to seize even reduce it. But if it collides with the public interest, it is generally prioritized; (9) Ahmadiyah is a cult and is outside of Islam. Ahmadiyah followers are apostates; (10) illegitimate women become prayers as long as there are men who are aqil-balig; (11) MUI allows capital punishment for serious crimes (Rumadi, 2012: 46).

The explanation above gives a little description of the MUI fatwa issued by the MUI Fatwa Council, which states that Ahok has committed blasphemy against Islam. The Islamic Defense Act I, II, and III conducted on October 14, 2016, November 4, 2016 and December 2, 2016 were critical events to see religious developments in Indonesia. One of them relates to fragmentation of religious authority (fragmentation or fragmentation of religious authority). Fragmentation of
religious authority occurs in Muslims in Indonesia. If previously NU, Muhammadiyah and the MUI were national religious authorities, new figures and institutions were emerging outside NU and Muhammadiyah. Rizieq Syihab is a name that is a new center of religious authority after the Islamic Defense Act.

This can be seen from the suggestion from Said Agil Siradj, General Chairperson of the PBNU (the Nahdlatul Ulama Executive Board), who was ignored by some NU residents. Siradj advised NU residents not to join the Islamic Defense Act III and NU issued a fatwa that Friday prayers on the highway were illegal. Instead of following this recommendation, some pesantren in West Java such as Ciamis and Tasikmalaya actually sent their students to go to Monas on foot. Of course the normalized affiliation of the pesantren needs to be seen again. However, it cannot be denied that many of the NU residents have joined or supported the Bela Islam 212 Action.

What happened in NU also happened at Muhammadiyah. The suggestion of Haedar Nashir, General Chairperson of Muhammadiyah PP, to the citizens not to take action like fell on deaf ears, was ignored by Muhammadiyah members. Instead of following the recommendations of the general chairman, many NU and Muhammadiyah residents chose to join Rizieq Syihab, Abdullah Gymnastiar, Arifin Ilham, Bachtiar Nasir, and Zaitun Rasmin to take action centrally at the Monas Monument (National Monument) Jakarta.

NU and Muhammadiyah which have often been seen as two main wings or representations of Islam in Indonesia. But in the Action of Islamic Defense I, II, and III, the two wings are like not functioning, either as a representation of Indonesian Islam or as a balancing between radicalism and liberalism. There are other colors of Islam that have not been overlooked or tend to be ignored or even seen as parasites that actually appear.
Although some participants rejected Rizieq Syihab's leadership and role in Actions 411 and 212, it cannot be denied that Syihab continued to build his authority and credibility as a Muslim leader from the incident. And since the incident there has been a growing presence of new religious authority outside of NU and Muhammadiyah which is heard by Indonesian Muslims. In addition to the instructions of Haedar Nashir and Said Agil Siradj which were not considered by the people, the shift of religious authority or the change in the map of religious authority in Indonesia can be seen in the case that afflicted several Indonesian Muslim scholars; Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Ahmad Mustofa Bisri and Muhammad Quraish Shihab.

The Muslim scholars are trying to criticize the attitude of Muslims in addressing the Ahok case. Instead of being listened to, they are cursed and bullied in various places, especially on social media. If Rizieq Syihab who attacks Ahok continues to be praised, the Muslim scholars who try to criticize the attitude continue to be criticized. Of course the presence of Rizieq Syihab cannot be said to shift or rival the role of NU and Muhammadiyah in Indonesia. Although Syihab has developed activities from the FPI not only in sweeping and attacking bars and discotheques, but also in humanitarian and economic actions, what they have done cannot be compared to the activities of NU and Muhammadiyah in education and health. Its presence is only at the limit of providing alternatives and challenges to the issue of authority talking about religious issues. This then became a serious challenge for NU and Muhammadiyah.

The weakening of religious authority is also strongly influenced by the information and communication technology revolution, especially with the existence of the internet and social media, people can easily learn and seek information related to religious issues. Information that was previously only accessible through books or by studying at pesantren, can now be easily asked by Habib Google. This information technology also provides an opportunity for
someone to become a mufti or cleric or cleric without having to study religion for decades. This condition has in fact theoretically demonstrated the fragmentation of religious authority, not only in Indonesia, but throughout the world and throughout religious traditions.

Finally, NU and Muhammadiyah will of course still be a representation of Indonesian Islam in the years to come. But the Islamic map in Indonesia can no longer be reduced or represented by the two organizations. There is another color of Islam as represented by the FPI which in this case tried to ride on the MUI’s Fatwa which continued to grow and became a challenger to the existence of the two oldest and largest mass organizations.

MUI as part of the state that functions to issue fatwas on Islam, should be able to maintain its independence from various pressures of radical and political-minded Islamic groups. Although the community will not be so concerned with these fatwas, but in the context of national life and the state of the fatwas it is disturbing, it does not even rule out that the fatwa will have a worse impact, especially in the context of interfaith relations. Religion also becomes very shallow. This proves that the problem of religious life in Indonesia is not in society, but in religious elites.

At this level, religion is often politicized for certain interests, and is always placed in the context of competition from one religion to another. This marks two things at once. On the one hand this can be read as a sign that MUI is becoming a more "toothed" religious institution, and on the other hand this is also a sign of the strengthening of fundamentalist groups through the birth of religious institutions initiated by the New Order government. The MUI, both central and regional, again shows itself as the most authoritative force to determine whether or not a group and religious sect are misguided.
Will the “Aksi Bela Islam” Change the Map of Islamic Political Movements in Indonesia?

Islamic Defense Action is a solidarity-based protest movement glued by an issue of blasphemy and, in other contexts, the Election of the Governor of DKI Jakarta. Many Muslim figures were present at ABI who had large numbers of worshipers, but they had a pattern of da’wah that was different from one another and brought the topics of the lecture which were also not the same. Some Muslim leaders or community leaders and leaders of the Majlis Taklim, such as Abdullah Gymnastiar ("Aa Gym") the leader of Daarut Tauhid Islamic Boarding School in Bandung, Muhammad Arifin Inspector of Majlis Zikir Az-Zikra, Habib Riziek Shihab FPI High Priest, Bachtian Nasir GNPF Chairman Secretary General of the Indonesian Young Intellectual and Ulema Council (MIUMI), Kyai Ma'ruf Amin Chairperson of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), and figures from other Islamic organizations that have many congregations are able to sit together in ABI to raise common issues: protest over the blasphemy problem. Not a few local Islamic leaders from various regions, especially from satellite cities in West Java, and other large cities were present to provide support to the Islamic Defense Action.

If we look further, there is a character of the da’wah model that is different from each of the Islamic figures mentioned above, at least those that often appear are reported on television or media. Aa Gym is a muballigh who is very well known for her hospitality. His style of lecture is soft and humorous and inspiring for young people and families. Da’wah Aa Gym has a characteristic theme that is related to the drive to build morals for the younger generation. He rarely speaks politically, and especially those related to direct elections. Correspondingly, Bachtian Nasir who is also Secretary General of the Indonesian Young Intellectual and Ulema Council (MIUMI) in his daily activities is more spent on the activities of da’wah in the campus and some private television stations (with the Tahfidz Al-Qur’an theme).
Meanwhile, Muhammad Arifin Ilham as chairman of the Dhikr Council had a specific dakwah theme, which encouraged the increase of Muslim spirituality and religious awareness through remembrance. In certain contexts, Arifin's inspired teaching model resembles or approaches suluk or tasawuf style. Likewise Kyai Ma'ruf Amin who represented the MUI, was very rarely involved in movements involving mass action. As chairman of the MUI, Kyai Ma'ruf Amin who is also the chairman of the Rais 'Aam Nahdlatul Ulama's Main Board, has strong connections and relations to communicate with the authorities government, including the President when voicing aspirations.

On the other hand, large Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama tried to keep their distance from ABI. These two organizations did not give a clear statement on the position of ABI or about blasphemy. Both also asked cadres and residents not to carry organizational attributes if they were involved in ABI activities. Because, behind the public appearance of the two organizations, there is a long debate whether ABI is a protest movement solely on the statement of Ahok (Candidate for Governor of DKI), or indeed it is politically driven solely to tackle Ahok's nomination.

The involvement of many Islamic elements and mass organizations in ABI invited several questions, whether the cohesiveness of the organizations in the ABI movement can last a long time or is it vulnerable to "melt" after "freezing" in a demonstration?

For certain Islamic movements, as noted by Kumar (2012: 22-23), since the beginning of the 20th century, there emerged a political movement aimed at restoring Islamic supremacy from the scourge of colonialism spearheaded by Muslim figures such as Hasan Al-Bana and Abul Ala Al Maududi. This movement which we later came to know as Political Islam has long been in the archipelago, being part of what we now understand as Nusantara Islam itself and we can see
them in today’s demonstration as one of the dominant forces. Appealing to the variant of the Islamic movement to "not use Islam for politics" is the same as calling on "do not use oxygen to breathe."

What is worrying about the rise of the Islamic movement, with Political Islam as one of its exponents, in Indonesia today is that it is present in the midst of a vacuum of class-based political power and an increasingly crazy economic neoliberalization. Especially in a city like Jakarta. Berman and Rose, explained that economic neoliberalization which brings excesses to the harsh daily life of urban society, ultimately creates an ideal environment that creates religious solidarity and communal identity. Industrial acceleration that has taken place since the New Order created a large lumpen proletariat. They are, as part of a Muslim society that has long been oppressed and exploited economically by a secular government, which is then accommodated by its populist aspirations and complaints by the Islamic movement (Hadiz, 2016: 43).

Plus the fight against terrorism at the global level, the two contexts above have shaped our (negative) perceptions of Islam Politics. Moreover, political Islam is expressed on the streets. There are many unhealthy prejudices launched against the Islamist movement. One of the most frequently mentioned on social media is that this movement does not fit into the archipelago ecosystem and must be exiled to the Middle East. This is the same opinion as the ultra-right racist group Golden Dawn in Greece, which considers all violence to be Arab and must be returned to Arabia. There is also a condescending prejudice that considers every mass action of Political Islam to be a crowd of unemployed who expect packaged rice.

First, this kind of prejudice has diverted attention from the real culprit of unemployment, namely capitalism. It is as if the Islamist movement has been responsible for increasingly worrying about the unemployment rate, even though we are facing a labor regime that believes in labor flexibility.
Secondly, by demeaning the masses of the Islamist movement as a mass that is only motivated by rewards, we will not be able to understand their political perspectives and their contradictions. There will be no discussion that can take place democratically and mature if this prejudice continues to be maintained.

Many are actually more opposed to mass action than political Islam. After the first wave of the Islamic movement on October 14, 2016, social media noisy for days about damaged parks around the National Monument. This noise is not as substantive as fussing over a pile of garbage near the State Palace after the Labor Day demonstration. Some people who were concerned about the damaged parks near Monas were silent people when mining companies damaged the Kendeng mountains and cheered when our brothers in Papua were brutally murdered on behalf of the Republic of Indonesia.

Even though like it or not, Political Islam has been a part of the archipelago's political thinking for a long time. If indeed we are ready to accept Political Islam as part of the repertoire of political thought in Indonesia, then we need to provide radical criticism of the contradictions of the Islamist movement. Deradicalization which is often used by both countries and non-state groups as a strategy to stem the Islamist movement is not the right strategy. Why do you de-radicalize the Islamist movement which is not radical at all? Radical means rooted, so acting radically means acting based on deep understanding.

Spouting racism shamelessly and selling out unbelieving accusations, like the Islamist movement like the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), does not reflect an action that departs from deep understanding. We are seeing a confused Islamic movement. They held a massive action because of accusations of defamation that was less convincing with video snippets from Facebook. Some groups that reject liberal democracy as an infidel product are eager to go on the road to electoral moments like now. This signifies the reactionary character of those who have no
clear agenda. They urged Ahok to be arrested by Indonesian police and processed by Indonesian law.

That is, indirectly the Islamist movement recognizes their submission to the Indonesian police and law which on several occasions they call the taghut system. Later many Islamists called for absurd slogans such as "Indonesian Republic of Indonesia" and some other Islamists allied politically with Ahmad Dhani’s celebrity who was full of obscene entertainment. We are not facing a radical Islamist movement, we are facing a shallow and confused Islamic movement.

Besides that, with a very diverse background and characteristics of Islamic organizations that are in ABI, it is a challenge for ABI to maintain its cohesiveness, especially after the demonstration of political issues is increasingly wildly colored between the pros and cons of ABI, or rather the pros and cons between supporters and Ahok’s political enemy. As a solidarity movement, the power of the issue is the key to maintaining cohesiveness between different groups to stay in line and transform the energy they have to make the desired changes. That is, if ABI is only intended or only to target Ahok to be imprisoned so that he cannot lead DKI Jakarta, then it is clear that ABI can be categorized as a protest movement. In this context, it might be possible to quote Asef Bayat’s statement about the characteristics of the protest movement:

"... protest movements, which may culminate in insurrections, are usually transitory and do not last long. They either achieve their goal or are suppressed. Since they directly challenge the political authority, the most critical element of protest movement is sustainability. "(Bayat, 2007: 19)

Therefore, after ABI 3, existing groups returned to their respective habitats and re-carried out social activism-da’wah as unique characteristics possessed by each group. A sense of solidarity that had strengthened to be able to unite steps might still exist in each group, but maintaining the sustainability of the Islamic movement in accordance with the model of da’wah owned by each group became
more important. The reason is that, as a movement, Islamic organizations have a longer future and a wider and lasting (a longer time span) public relations project, while a solidarity-based protest movement is only for the short term (a short life-span).

Conclusion

The final episode towards the end of 2016 saw a series of "Bela Islam" actions which successfully mobilized very many Muslims in Jakarta. There was a lot of suspicion and support from various groups related to the action, both optimism and pessimism each had their arguments and interests held by the researchers. So that in this short study the writer cannot conclude the Action of Islamic Defense and can only provide a final note from the observations of the author.

First, as a social movement of Islamic articulation of Muslims that is packaged through the Action of Islamic Defenders becomes a forerunner to foster a strong tradition of civil society. This is important, considering that civil society is a condition for the establishment of democracy. He boils down to the need for strengthening the community (citizens) to balance, as well as being able to control the policies of a distorted country and tend to position citizens as weak subjects.

Second, with the information and communication technology revolution, especially with the existence of the internet and social media, people can easily learn and seek information related to religious issues. This information technology also provides an opportunity for someone to become a mufti or cleric or cleric without having to study religion for decades. This condition has in fact theoretically demonstrated the fragmentation of religious authority, not only in Indonesia, but throughout the world and throughout religious traditions. NU and Muhammadiyah will of course still be a representation of Indonesian Islam in the years to come. But the Islamic map in Indonesia can no longer be reduced or represented by the two organizations. There is another color of Islam as represented by the FPI which
continues to grow and become a challenger to the existence of the two oldest and largest mass organizations.

Third, in addition to building the spirit of solidarity, articulation of political Islam is primarily aimed at developing the capacity and awareness of the wider community. This is mainly related to issues of justice in economic equality. After the Islamic Defense Act, these symptoms appear from the emergence of a unifying movement of all the economic forces of the Muslim Ummah which is intended to encourage a more equitable national economic governance.
Reference


